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THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
RECIPIENT -

SHOULD HE ACCEPT A JOB?
INTRODUCTION

E MPLOYMENT

security acts, which exists in nearly every state,
are designed to provide income to a worker who through no fault
of his own, has lost his job.
The Colorado Employment Security Act,' originally enacted
in 1935 as the Colorado Unemployment Act, is an example of how
this end is accomplished. Under the act employers coming within
its purview make contributions,2 based on their employees' wages,
into a state unemployment compensation fund.' Payments from this
fund are paid by the Unemployment Compensation Commission to
4
applicants who have filed the forms and have otherwise qualified.
These unemployment benefits serve the purpose of providing the
claimant with income while he searches for new work. The overall
program is aimed at returning the claimant to the active work force
as soon as possible. To achieve this end, the claimant must comply
with certain requirements to remain eligible for the payments. Thus,
during his period of unemployment, he must be registered at one
of the State Employment Offices maintained throughout the state
by the Department of Employment Security,' be available for work,
and conduct a thorough and active search for new employment.'
Another condition takes priority over the above requirements
in importance to the worker: he cannot refuse an offer or referral
of suitable work. A violation of this condition precipitates the discontinuance of the benefits.7 The significance of this provision lies
not only in the loss of the claimant's sole source of income but also
in the vagueness of its terms. By studying factual problems arising
under this condition and interpretations placed upon it, this uncertainty will be more apparent. Guidelines may then be suggested
which would benefit not only the claimant in determining whether
his action will breach the requirement, but also the agency that must
determine if the condition has been breached. In light of this fact,
1 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 82-1-1 to -13-6 (Supp. 1965).
2 COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-6-1 (1963).
3 COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-7-1 (1963).
4 COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-1-2 (1963) ; COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-4-7 (Supp. 1965).
5 COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-4-7(2) (1963) ; see also Reg. 7A of the Regulations of the
Colorado Department of Employment Security.
6 COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-4-7(4), (8) (Supp. 1965).
7 COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-4-8(6) (c) (i) (Supp. 1965).
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this note will be devoted to discussing both opinions and problems
which have emerged from this requirement.
I.

OFFER OF WORK

In order for a claimant to disqualify himself from receiving
benefits for failure to accept suitable work, he obviously must have
first received an offer of work. Although the existence of an offer
will usually be an easy factual question to resolve, certain situations
may arise which cause some difficulty. Does general knowledge of
job openings in a worker's occupational field constitute an offer if
he feels he could qualify for the work? Is a help-wanted advertisement in a magazine or newspaper an offer of work in the statutory
sense? Situations like these lack elements which usually attend an
"offer of work" in common parlance.' Normally an offer is for a
particular job and is directed at and communicated to the claimant
personally. Furthermore the existence of an offer requires that the
"offeror" anticipated an acceptance or rejection. Applying this test
to the situations involving advertisements or general knowledge of
job opportunities, it would seem that they should not be considered
an offer of work. However, if the worker who possesses a unique
skill in an occupational field which can be used by few employers,
refuses to investigate a job offer in an advertisement made by one
of those employers, he may, by the very nature of the work and
limited number of potential employers have had an offer of work
within the meaning of the statute. Courts have had occasion to apply
the above standards. Thus, a call from a claimant's employment
service asking whether he is interested in sales work, to which the
claimant answers in the negative, cannot be considered as an offer.9
It lacks the specificity which inheres in an offer. Likewise, a statement by an employer to his former employees that they might be
given jobs if they would file applications was not sufficiently
definite to be an offer. Hence, the employees' failure to fill out
applications was not a refusal to accept suitable work.' °
II.

REJECTION OF WORK

Few problems arise with respect to whether an offer has been
rejected. It would seem possible for a claimant to reject an offer
8 Although advertisements and "want ads" in a magazine may not constitute an offer
under the suitable work provision, it should be recognized that a claimant's failure
to inquire about such offers may disqualify him from receiving further benefits on the
ground that he is not actively seeking work under COLO. REv. STAT. § 82-4-7(8)
(Supp. 1965).
9 Jackson v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security, 124 Ind. App. 648, 120
N.E.2d 413 (1954).
10 Muncie Foundry Div. of Borg-Warner Corp. v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment
Security Division, 114 Ind. App. 475, 51 N.E.2d 891 (1943).
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not only by express refusal but also by his conduct. Once a claimant
has received what is considered a valid offer, he should be required
to exercise a certain degree of diligence in accepting the offer. Thus,
a claimant who receives an offer of work and accepts it two weeks
later only to find the job filled, might properly be denied further
unemployment benefits because he has "refused" work. This result
would seem even more valid if the offer is for seasonal work and
the position must be filled immediately.
The problem has arisen as to whether or not an offer has to be
made before there can be a refusal. Despite the conceptual difficulty
in the issue, it was presented to the court in Loew's Inc. v. California
Employment Stablization Comm'n.1' In that case nine motion picture
studios had agreed with a casting corporation that the latter was to
hire extras for the former. Extras were paid $10.50 per day when
appearing in scenes using less than thirty persons and $5.50 per day
when more than thirty persons were required. Separate telephones
were used for hiring in each group, and extras were to call both
numbers each day to apply for work. The claimants had both telephone numbers but called only the $10.50 number. They filed for
benefits for the period of time during which no $10.50 work was
available. However, during the same time period extras were needed
for the lower salary work. The court held that their failure to call
the second number when work was available was a refusal even
though there had been no specific offer of such work.
III.

SUITABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT

Whether particular employment is "suitable" is one of the
more perplexing questions presented by the statutory provision disqualifying a claimant who refuses that employment. To determine
whether offered employment is suitable most state legislatures have
supplied their administrative agencies with specific guidelines by
which to determine the suitability of employment for its claimants.
In Colorado, for example, it is provided that:
In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, the degree of risk involved to his health, safety and morals,
his physical fitness and prior training, his experience and prior
earnings, his length of unemployment and prospects for securing
work in his customary occupation, and the distance of the available
local work from his residence, shall be considered. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, no work shall be deemed
suitable and benefits shall not be denied under this chapter to any
otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under
any of the following conditions:
(ii) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute.
11 76 Cal. App. 2d 231, 172 P.2d 938 (1946).
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(iii) If the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered
are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality.
(iv) If as a condition of being employed the individual would be
from or refrain from
required to join a company union or to resign
2
joining any bona fide labor organization.'
Despite these enumerated guidelines, many situations have been
presented which require resolution by court and agency decisions.
A. Health, Safety and Morals
This standard is an attempt to make the job fit the claimant
rather than forcing the claimant to work at a job which would
seriously affect his health, safety or morals; no individual should be
required to accept employment which would be physically detrimental
to his well-being . Thus, a woman lacking satisfactory transportation,
who would not accept nightshift work in an undesirable neighborhood, was not disqualified from receiving further benefits. Her
action was not a refusal of suitable employment. 13 An elderly woman
suffering from neuritis refused a job offer which would have required her to work twelve consecutive hours on two of five working
days. She was held by the referee not to have refused suitable employment because the job would have adversely affected her health. 4
In another case, the claimant was justified in refusing a spray paint
job on the ground that he was allergic to paint.' 5
Generally, courts have taken a liberal view in determining
whether employment will impair the health or safety of an individual.
However, whether or not emotional and mental health is encompassed by the health and safety exception to disqualification
seems uncertain. In one case the referee seemed to suggest that
emotional and mental health problems, as well as physical hazards,
will be a sufficient basis for refusal. In that case, the claimant refused
to return to a job in a department where she had been slurred or
insulted and tripped or hit while going downstairs. Because the
claimant had two previous experiences in the department which
2

1 COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-4-8(6)(c)(i)-(iv)

(Supp. 1965).
Referee's Decision-847 (Colo. 1955) [hereinafter cited as RD). The author has taken
Colorado administrative decisions from the Commerce Clearing House Unemployment Insurance Reporter, Vol. IB. The citation system consists of two letters designating the appellate body which heard the case. Thus, RD means "Referee's Decision."
The digits following the letters are the number of the case; all cases decided during
any given year are numbered in consecutive order. The abbreviation, "Colo." has been
inserted to remind the reader that Colorado law is being cited. The cases reported in
the Unemployment Insurance Reporter are extracts rather than entire opinions. Many
agency decisions cited by various writers are taken from the Unemployment Compensation Interpretation Service: Benefit Series. Since this service is not available to the
author, no reference will be made to it.
14 RD-6382 (Colo. 1953).
15 Sledzianowski v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 168 Pa. Super. 37,
76 A.2d 666 (1950).
13
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were so upsetting as to interfere with her work and give her a
nervous condition, the referee held that she should not be precluded
from receiving benefits due to her refusal.1 6
Other cases have been more explicit in saying emotional or
mental problems fall within the health exception. The Pennsylvania
Superior Court held that a victim of St. Vitus' dance was justified
in refusing a piece work job because it would make him too nervous, 1 7 and an Iowa court held that a person with tendencies toward
nervousness was not required to accept a night job with mental
patients.' 8
Despite the fact that the courts and agencies have been fairly
liberal toward the claimant where his physical and mental wellbeing are concerned, the burden is on the claimant to prove that a
potential job will adversely affect his health or safety. Evidence to
accomplish this is usually prior experience or medical records. But
the problem is treated differently where a claimant refuses a job
without adequate proof of harm reasonably anticipated from a
prospective job. In Wolfgram v. Employment Security Agency,' 9
benefits were denied where the claimant refused to accept a job in
a mine because work several years previously at a lower level of
the mine had caused heat rash. In rendering its opinion the court
said, "Where a claimant refuses an offered job because of a fear
that such job would be detrimental to his health, without further
investigation, or inquiry, he is deemed ineligible for benefits unless
he first gives the offered job a fair trial." 20
This manner of treating cases differently on the basis of whether
prior experience or medical reports exist seems justified. Without
such a qualification, the claimant might easily resort to a defense
of refusing a job on some fictitious physical or mental condition
which he could claim would be aggravated by his acceptance. However, this is not to say that if a claimant has no medical records or
prior experience, his refusal should automatically be considered a
violation of the suitable work provision. In such cases the reasons
for refusing on a health basis should always be considered carefully.
One frequently litigated question is whether a claimant's religion
should be taken into consideration in determining whether he has
refused suitable employment. The situation arises where claimant
16 RD-2268 (Colo. 1949).
17 Dep't. of Labor and Industry v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 159 Pa.
Super. 571, 49 A.2d 259 (1946).
18 Forrest Park Sanitarium v. Miller, 233 Iowa 1325, 11 N.W.2d 583 (1943).
19 77 Idaho 298, 291 P.2d 279 (1955).
20 Id. at 300, 291 P.2d at 281 (1955) ; see also Broadway v. Bolar, 33 Ala. App. 57, 29
So. 2d 687 (1947) (claimant failed to investigate job) ;Claim of DiStefano, 277 App.
Div. 823, 97 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1950) (failure to try out job).
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refuses to accept a job because it will require him to work on a day
which interferes with his religious beliefs. In 1963, the United States
21
Supreme Court decided this question on constitutional grounds.
In holding that the South Carolina Employment Commission violated
claimant's First Amendment rights under the Constitution by disallowing her claim, the Court said:
The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of
her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one band, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work,
on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts
the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as
would
22
a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.

The majority of state high courts which have been confronted
with that issue have held that refusal of work for religious reasons
does not disqualify claimant from receiving benefits. In In the
Matter of Miller,23 the claimant was a member of the Seventh Day
Adventist Church, which teaches that the sabbath is from sundown
Friday until sundown Saturday during which time no work is to be
performed. The North Carolina Supreme Court decided that work
on Friday night was not suitable for her, and she should not be precluded from receiving benefits. Cases involving similar fact situa25
tions have reached the same result in both Michigan 24 and Ohio.
In these religion cases, it must be determined that claimant's
religious objection is made in good faith. Obviously, ad hoc adoption
of religious beliefs should not justify refusing employment. It would
seem that religious convictions previously professed might properly
be considered to determine the propriety of the refusal. However,
once it is determined that claimant has honest religious beliefs which
would interfere with his acceptance of a proferred job, the belief
must be respected.
B. Prior Training and Experience
This statutory provision requires that for a job to be suitable,
it must be reasonably related to the qualifications of the applicant.
The basic theory is that the claimant should not be required to
accept a job which involves far less or a different type skill than he
possesses.2" The real problem involved here is how much less skill
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Id. at 404.
23 243 N.C. 509, 91 S.E.2d 241 (1956).
24 Swenson v. Michigan Employment Security Comm'n, 340 Mich. 430, 65 N.W.2d 709
(1954).
25 Tary v. Bd. of Review, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 161 Ohio St. 251,
119 N.E.2d 56 (1954).
26 Frequently, this factor is intimately related to the problems of lower wages, the length
of unemployment and general prospects of the claimant's securing his customary work,
and it will be discussed in context with these factors in Section (D) infra.
21

22
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does a job require before a claimant will be allowed to reject the
offer in that a claimant may properly be required to accept a job
involving a level of skill which is inferior to that already attained by
him. In a Colorado agency decision, the claimant held a doctorate
in physics and had been last employed as a research assistant in the
missile industry. She refused employment as a door-to-door salesman. The referee held that she had not refused suitable employment
in light of her high educational background and lack of experience
27
in the offered work.
Court decisions support similar results. In Pacific Mills v.
Director of Division of Employment Security,28 the claimant had
gone to business college and been trained for office work. She worked
as a secretary for Pacific Mills until she was laid off. Later, she
refused work in the shipping department; the work constituted
stapling tags to pieces of cloth and recording yardage on an adding
machine. Despite the fact that the wages for the two jobs were about
equal, claimant was held not to have refused suitable work. In a
Minnesota case, the court determined that the claimant did not refuse
suitable employment where he had been trained as a steam cleaner
in a dry cleaning department and then refused a job consisting of
light garage work, stockwork and truckdriving.2"
Several cases have held that the claimant is reasonably suited
for a different job even though the levels of skill involved in the
present and former employments are not the same. In Beecham v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp.,30 a night watchman who refused a job as
a janitor was held to have refused suitable work. The same result
occured where a stenographer refused a job as a clerk and typist,"'
a manager of a dress shop would not accept a job as a saleslady in a
department store,32 or a photographic helper would not work as a
stock clerk at substantially higher wages.33
The latter case raises the question of whether a claimant should
be required to accept a job which, although it pays substantially more,
involves far less skill than his former employment. An example might
be a commercial artist who earned $4,000 a year being offered a job
as an inventory clerk at $6,000 a year. It is suggested that the claimant should not be required to accept such a job unless jobs in his
27 RD-24892 (Colo. 1964).

28 322 Mass. 345, 77 N.E.2d 413 (1948).
29 Bowman v. Troy Launderers and Cleaners, 215 Minn. 226, 9 N.W.2d 506 (1943).
30 150 Neb. 792, 36 N.W.2d 233 (1949).

31 Boyle v. Corsi, 277 App. Div. 1155, 100 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1950).
32 Grubman v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 175 Pa. Super. 488, 107
A.2d 186 (1954).
33 Friedman v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 201 Pa. Super. 641, 193
A.2d 676 (1963).
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former occupational field are extremely scarce. The mere fact that
claimant refuses such a job offer will normally indicate that he
himself places a premium on his own experience and ability and considers utilization of his skill more important than higher financial
reward. Aside from maintaining the personal pride of the individual
himself, it is submitted that maximum utilization of a worker's skills
and experience is a desirable end within the framework of the entire
economic system. However, it should be remembered that one of the
act's primary purposes is to return the worker to the active labor
force and too great an emphasis on maximum use of a worker's skills
may have the effect of thwarting this aim.
C. PriorEarnings and Wages in Similar Employments
The Employment Security Act is designed to preserve as much
as possible the present economic status and standard of living of the
individual. This goal is indicated by the legislative requirements
that the claimant's former wages and wages for similar work in the
locality be considered by the agency charged with determining
whether the unemployed worker has refused suitable work. 4 Both
the prevailing wage rate and the claimant's prior earnings should
be considered at the same time, and if the newly offered job falls
sufficiently short of either standard, the claimant should not be
denied benefits.
In Industrial Commission v. Brady,8" the claimant was a union
painter and had earned $2.39 per hour on his previous job with
time-and-a-half for overtime work. He refused to interview for a
non-union job which would have paid $2.00 per hour without overtime provision. The referee found that the prevailing wage rate in
the locality was $2.39 per hour with time-and-a-half for overtime.
In holding that the claimant had not refused suitable employment
because the wage offered was substantially less favorable than the
prevailing wage in the locality for that type work, the court said:
Assuming other conditions to be equal, it is apparent that where
the wage differential amounts to $15.60 per forty-hour week, or
$624.00 per year on a forty-week year, such employment . . . was
substantially less favorable to3 6the individual than that prevailing
for similar work in the locality.
The problem surrounding wage differences and their effect
upon the suitability provision will, in many cases, be no more than
As is the case with respect to jobs requiring less skill or training than claimant possesses, the length of time during which claimant has been unemployed may be an important factor in considering whether offered remuneration is sufficient. This interrelationship will be discussed in Section (D) infra. It should also be appreciated
that the problem of adequate wages is most often encountered in those jobs requiring
less skill and training since a lower skilled occupation will usually involve less salary.
85 128 Colo. 490, 263 P.2d 578 (1953).
86 Id. at 494-95, 263 P.2d at 580.
84
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a calculated value judgment by the court or agency deciding the
question. Thus, refusals of employment were held not justified where
the difference in salary between former employment and offered
employment was eleven cents per hour,87 where a claimant who had
been employed as a research chemist earning $750 per month refused
a job as a chemical engineer at $500 per month,3 8 and where a claimant who had been employed as a general office worker at $100 per
week refused a job as assistant bookkeeper at sixty dollars per
week.8 9 Conversely, a former seamstress earning $1.10 per hour was
justified in refusing a job as a waitress at 62 cents per hour, 40 and
a former packer earning $1.44 per hour could rightfully reject an
offer to work as a sales clerk at 60 cents per hour.4
Little can be drawn from the above cases other than the fact
that a wide range of discretion exists in the agencies and courts when
determining whether an offered wage is sufficient. Despite the range
of discretion, certain factors might easily be neglected. A situation
may arise where a claimant is offered a job for which he will receive
compensation commensurate with local standards and prior earnings,
yet he may be required to work substantially longer hours to receive
the salary. In order to properly compare the wages for each job, both
should be converted into a dollar per hour figure. Once this figure
has been determined for the two jobs, the wage difference is readily
ascertainable. What is most important is the meaning of the wage
to the claimant and not merely the salary figure standing by itself.
Another problem may arise where the wage offered conforms
to local standards yet it is still not substantial enough to provide the
claimant with a living wage. Because of this possibility, it would
seem necessary for the agency to look at the claimant's domestic
circumstances in deciding the problem. There may be instances
where the offered wage would be sufficient to support a claimant
with a wife and one child yet at the same time be totally inadequate
for a claimant with a large family. By analogy to a case previously
discussed, the chemist who is single might properly be required to
accept the offer of work as a chemical engineer at $250 less per
month than his former job paid. However, if this claimant has ten
children and a wife to support, he should probably not be held to
have refused suitable work under the same circumstances. To require
87

Claim of Mednick, 270 App. Div. 124, 58 N.Y.S2d 493 '(1945).

8 Lorenzi v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 197 Pa. Super. 573, 180 A.2d
84 (1962).
89 Valentine v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 197 Pa. Super. 574, 180
40
41

A.2d 85 (1962).
Palmer v. State Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 19 Ohio Op. 2d 362, 177
N.E.2d 806 (1961).
Merck & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 184 Pa. Super. 138, 132
A.2d 727'(1957).
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the latter to accept the job would not only defeat one of the aims of
the act but also restrict the claimant's mobility to search for a new
job which would provide compensation sufficient to sustain himself
and his family.
A question may arise as to what extent fringe benefits should
be considered in determining wage suitability. A claimant may be
offered a job which falls below the local wage standard yet fringe
benefits incident to the employment may have a value sufficient to
offset this difference. The mere fact that the fringe benefit has a
face value sufficient to compensate for a wage difference should
not be considered as controlling. It may not have such a high value
to the claimant himself. For example, the claimant may have no
interest in a pension plan financed primarily by employer contributions. In some cases the value of such a benefit may be needed by
him to support his family adequately. The agency should attempt to
ascertain the value of the fringe benefit to the claimant in light of
his circumstances and determine its offsetting effect on lower wages
in this manner.
D. Length of Unemployment and Prospect of Securing Work in
Customary Occupation
Where an offered job involves less skill and lower wages, the
courts consider the claimant's length of unemployment and the prospects of his finding similar work in determining whether the job
is suitable. Thus, a job may be unsuitable when first offered yet be
declared suitable if offered again after a period of unemployment.
In Bayly Mfg. Co. v. Department of Employment,42 the Colorado
Supreme Court gave some indication as to when a claimant would
be required to accept a job at substantially lower pay than what he
had previously earned. Claimants had worked in a clothing factory
earning between $1.40 and $2.00 per hour. This operation was transferred to another locality and claimants later refused to accept work
making overalls in which they could earn only about $1.00 per hour.
The court, in remanding to the district court for further findings
of fact, said:
It is clear that the beneficient purposes of the Act do not contain a guaranty that a job offer must be for wages equal to that of
the old job in order to be deemed as "suitable" work, but work at
a substantially lower wage should not be deemed "suitable" unless
a claimant has been given a reasonable period to compete in the
labor market for available jobs for which he has the skill at a rate
of pay commensurate with his prior earnings. Where the offer is
for work at a wage materially lower than the wage previously earned,
the claimant may be justified in refusing the offer while seeking
42 155

Colo. 433, 395 P.2d 216 (1964).
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employment at a rate of pay commensurate with prior earning
capacity, but this right is not without qualification and the claimant is entitled only to a reasonable opportunity to obtain work for
which he is fitted by experience and training at a wage rate comparable to that for which he previously worked.... Work which
may be deemed "unsuitable" at the inception of the claimant's unemployment, and for a reasonable time thereafter, because it pays
less than his prior earning capacity, may thereafter become "suitable" work when consideration is given to the length of unemployment and the prospects
for obtaining customary work at his prior
43
earning capacity.
In a New Hampshire case, claimant's previous job was that
of a skilled mender earning $1.04 per hour. After a ten-week period
of unemployment, an unskilled job paying sixty cents per hour,
which claimant had justifiably refused earlier, was held to be suit44
able work.
Despite the fact that claimant is allowed a "reasonable" period
of time before he will be required to accept work at substantially
less wages or skill, the problem of determining what is "reasonable"
still exists. Periods of five 45 and of nineteen 46 days have been held
insufficient time to discover new work. One solution to the problem
might be to set up a sliding scale requiring claimant to accept ten
dollars less pay per week after a month of unemployment, twenty
dollars less after two months, etc. However, a system such as this
would seem to be too inflexible to be workable. For example, the
prospect of claimant's obtaining work in his customary occupation
should be taken into account, and it would be difficult to devise a
uniform scale which could reflect this factor. If claimant X has been
unemployed for three months, yet it appears that he has a good
chance of receiving work in his customary occupation, he should not
be required to take a job in a different occupation involving less skill
or lower wages. However, it might be entirely proper to require
claimant Y to accept such a job, even though he has been unemployed
as long as X, if Y's chances of securing a job commensurate with his
skill appear slim.
It is difficult to rationalize the idea that what was once unsuitable work to the claimant is now suitable by the mere fact that a
certain amount of time has passed. Rather than accepting a suitable
job under these circumstances, the theory seems to be that claimant
should accept what is available and quit later when he is able to
43 Id. at 441-42, 395 P.2d at 220.
44 Hallahan v. Riley, 94 N.H. 48, 45 A.2d 886 (1946).

45 American Bridge Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 159 Pa. Super.
77, 46 A.2d 512 (1946).

46 American Bridge Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 159 Pa. Super.
74, 46 A.2d 510 (1946).
47 Comment, 13 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 523, 525 (1964).
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find better employment.4 7 On its face, this seems like a good idea,
but one of its effects will be to severely limit and restrict the claimant in his search for a job commensurate with his ability. It is common knowledge that most employment interviews are helding during
working hours, and the claimant, who will in most instances be
working during these hours, will not have the time in which to make
an adequate and thorough search. The result may often be that the
claimant finds himself tied down to a job which is in reality unsuitable without much chance to acquire more favorable employment or
at least compete with those who are able to interview and make
applications during the day.
Length of unemployment considerations should only arise where
wage and skill differentials are involved. If a claimant has refused
work for religious, health, or safety reasons, the length of unemployment should not have any impact on his refusal. Those reasons are
just as valid in the first as in the tenth week of unemployment.
E. Distance
The claimant should not be required to accept a job which is
too distant from his home. The practical effect of this guideline is
to tell the worker how much commuting he must do, and an unreasonable distance between the claimant's residence and the offered
employment renders it unsuitable." As is the case with most of the
other guidelines set forth by the legislature, determining what
amounts to an unreasonable distance is largely a discretionary matter
on the part of the agency.
In one agency decision the claimant was a resident of Denver
and refused a job offer in California. The referee held that he had
not refused suitable employment in that any job offer which requires
a claimant to re-establish his residence outside the state is unsuitable.4 9 In a Colorado Supreme Court decision, two coal miners refused to accept work in a mine located about 175 miles from their
homes. In reversing the agency, the court held they had not refused
suitable employment. The agency had relied on the fact that coal
50
mining was essential to the war effort.
In determining whether the distance is great enough to make
the job unsuitable, transportation facilities should be considered
carefully. A job thirty-five miles away from claimant's house may
not be too far if claimant owns a car or if a good carrier system runs
between the two points. However, a job only five miles away should
probably be deemed unsuitable if claimant has no transportation of
48 As a matter of policy, the agency does not require the claimant to relocate for a job.
49 RD-26001 (Colo. 1965).
50 Industrial Comm'n v. Lazar, 111 Colo. 69, 137 P.2d 405 (1943).
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his own and other means of transportation are not available. Agencies
seem to consider the availability of a public transportation system in
determining if the distance renders a job unsuitable. In one case
a claimant, who was the mother of five children, refused an offer
to cook at a hospital sixteen miles away because she had no means
of transportation at her disposal. She was deemed not to have refused
suitable employment." A claimant in another case refused a job
twelve miles away because she had no available transportation. The
referee, in holding that she remained eligible for benefits, said that
it was not required of a claimant to have her own transportation
52
where no common carrier transportation existed.
F. Other Circumstances
In addition to the statutory guidelines, other factors should be
considered by the agency in determining whether employment is
suitable. One example consists of personal circumstances of the
claimant, and although not mentioned in the statute, they should be
carefully scrutinized by the agency before making a final determination. In one case, it was held that a woman had not refused suitable
employment because the job required that she work at night which
would interfere with her domestic commitments. 8 Also, where a
claimant failed to apply for an offer of suitable work because of
plans, on advice of a doctor, to move her husband to another state
she was held to have refused work with good cause.5 4
CONCLUSION

Unemployed workers frequently are confronted with the
dilemma of determining whether or not their refusal of an offered
job will result in termination of their unemployment benefit checks.
This dilemma is caused by the uncertainty and vagueness inherent
in the statutory provisions providing for the forfeiture. Although the
statutes usually have guidelines designed to assist the agency in
ascertaining the applicability of the provision, the standards themselves are overly broad and, altogether too often, completely nonexistent. Thus, a claimant who has a job offer paying twenty cents
less per hour than his former employment and who desires to know
the effect of his refusal of the new job will only learn from the
statutes that the agency will consider the wage difference in determining if the worker is disqualified for future benefits. Another
claimant, who has an especially large family, will search in vain for
51 RD-2038 (Colo. 1948).
52 RD1665 (Colo. 1948).
53 RD-1421 (Colo. 1947).
54 RD-8842 (Colo. 1955).
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any indication that family size will be considered at all, let alone
what importance it will have in the agency decision.
The two hypotheticals above raise separate problems. On the
one hand is the situation in which the agency is expressly instructed
to take cognizance of specific facts (wage difference), on the
other hand is the case in which the agency may or may not consider
certain facts (family size) at its discretion. The latter problem warrants further legislative attention. Factors such as the size of the
claimant's family, personal domestic commitments, the standard of
living the new job will afford the worker, and the religious beliefs
of the claimant are not mandatorily reviewed by the agency. Hence
it is possible that the agency may overlook them or even apply the
disqualification provision in a situation where these factors would
justify the job refusal. For these reasons it is suggested that employment security statutes should specify these items in the guidelines to the agencies. Although statutory guidelines may be criticized
as being too broad, nonetheless, the claimant is assured that important
facts peculiar to him must be studied before forfeiture occurs.
It must be remembered that inclusion of the foregoing factors
in the statute would not completely solve the claimant's problem.
He would know what facts the agency must consider to determine
disqualification, but he would not know exactly when his refusal
would be justifiable. The statutory guidelines are general, and rightly
so, to provide flexibility in analyzing different fact situations. However, many cases may arise in which the claimant must know the
effect of his refusal within a short period of time. For example, the
employer may offer the claimant a job requesting that he either
accept or reject the offer by a specified time. The statutory guidelines will rarely be adequate to inform him of the effect of a refusal.
At the same time, it does the claimant little good to first refuse the
job and later be told that his refusal terminates his benefit payments.
Since the legislature cannot anticipate the multifarious situations which will arise under the act and hence cannot be more
specific in its guidelines to the agency, an alternative procedure to
these guidelines may be desirable. The agency could make available
to the claimant forms which request the pertinent information concerning the new job and also the claimant's personal circumstances
which the claimant believes might justify his refusal of the job.
The agency could then issue what would in essence be an advisory
opinion on the effect of such refusal. The opinion should be binding upon the agency unless the claimant has filed false or incomplete
information or otherwise defrauded the agency. The purpose of such
a procedure should be to inform the claimant of the probable effect
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of a refusal as soon as possible to avoid the claimant's loss of both
the unemployment benefits and a job.
In last analysis the application of the disqualification provision
in unemployment security statutes must rest in the agency. The
flexibility present in the current guidelines, supplemented by additional criteria, would assure the worker that his situation would
receive fullest consideration. The proposed procedure would assist
the worker in deciding whether or not to accept a job before the loss
of his unemployment benefits. The end result would be beneficial
to the worker in resolving his initial dilemma and would further the
purpose of unemployment security acts not only by returning the
worker to the active work force as soon as possible but also by
placing him in the most suitable job.
Arthur T. Voss
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